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Abstract 
Starting from early seventies, court-ordered school finance reforms (SFRs) have 
fundamentally changed the landscape of primary and elementary education finance in the US. This 
paper employs SFRs as quasi-experiments to quantify the effects of education equity on 
intergenerational mobility within commuting zones. First, I use reduced form difference-in-
difference analysis to show that 10 years of exposure to SFRs increases the average college 
attendance rate by about 5.2% for children with the lowest parent income. The effect of exposure 
to SFRs decreases with parent income and increases with the duration of exposure. Second, to 
directly model the causal pathways, I construct a measure for education inequity based on the 
association between school district education expenditure and median family income. Using 
exposure to SFRs as the instrumental variable, 2SLS analysis suggests that one standard deviation 
reduction in education inequality will cause the average college attendance rate to increase by 2.2% 
for children at the lower end of the parent income spectrum. Placing the magnitudes of these effects 
in context, I conclude that policies aimed at increasing education equity, such as SFRs, can 
substantially benefit poor children but they alone are not enough to overcome the high degree of 
existing inequalities.  
 








I. Introduction  
Starting from the Serrano v. Priest (1971) case in California, school finance lawsuits have 
fundamentally changed the landscape of primary and secondary education finance in the United 
States. In these lawsuits, the plaintiffs argued that the states had failed to provide just education 
financing and demanded reforms. The courts that ruled in favor of reforms would order the state 
legislatures to revise their education funding formulas. By channeling more state funds to poor 
districts, these court-ordered school finance reforms (SFRs) have increased the equity of 
education expenditures. A tally by Jackson, Johnson, and Persico (2015) counted that by 2010, 
school finance lawsuits had been brought up in 42 states, some of which had experienced 
multiple lawsuits (Figure 1). These lawsuits are still going on today and will continue to happen 
in the future. Given their prevalence and importance, it is crucial to thoroughly evaluate the 
effects of past SFRs.  
This paper provides new evidence on the long-term impacts of SFRs on intergenerational 
mobility, measured by the college attendance rates and child income rank. Exploiting SFRs as 
natural experiments, this study also answers a broader question: To what degree, if any, 
intergenerational mobility is causally determined by education equity? 
The past literature on court-ordered SFRs agreed that they had achieved the fiscal goals 
of curbing the within-state expenditure disparities (Murray, Evans, and Schwab 1998; Corcoran 
and Evans 2008) and reducing the correlation between expenditure and family income (Card and 
Payne 2002). Also, higher expenditure leads to more education inputs such as the number of 
teachers per pupil and teacher salary (Jackson, Johnson, and Persico 2016). However, the effects 
of SFRs on students’ outcomes during school are contested (Papke 2005; Guryan 2001; Downes 
and Figlio 1998; Hoxby 2001; Fischel 2006; Hanushek 2003), and the evidence on the long-term 
impacts of SFRs are very sparse. Card and Payne (2002) found tentative evidence that the 
equalization caused by SFRs narrows the SAT score outcomes across parent education 
categories. Jackson et al. (2016) found that the exogenous increase in school expenditures caused 
by court-ordered SFRs raises low-income children’s income and education attainment.  Besides 
the lack evidence on the long-term impacts of SFRs in general, the effects of SFR on 
intergenerational mobility have not been studied. Intergenerational mobility is defined over the 
entire range of parent income, yet existing studies (such as Card and Payne 2002 and Jackson et 
al. 2016) only grouped children by crude categories therefore cannot provide quantitative 
predictions regarding intergenerational mobility.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Other than providing additional evidence for policy evaluation, quantifying the impacts 
of SFRs on intergenerational mobility is also an important contribution to the mobility literature. 
Previous theoretical studies reached no consensus on the effects of education equity on 
intergenerational mobility: on one hand, more equitable education finance can transfer more 
funds to poor students and increase mobility. On the other hand, over-centralized education 
financing may weaken individual incentives to invest in education and decrease mobility (Solon 
2004; Checchi, Ichino, and Rustichini 1999). The task of determining the relationship between 
education equity and integrational mobility is left to empirical studies. While cross-country 
studies provide suggestive correlational evidence, CHKS data offers a unique opportunity to 
establish causal effects using panel data models. Although superior to cross-sectional analysis, 
OLS analysis using panel data still suffers from serious endogeneity concerns. Public funding is 
usually tied to the proportion of disadvantaged students, such as students who are learning 
English as a second language. An increase in the proportion of these students would cause public 
funding to increase. However, the positive impacts of additional funding might be offset by the 
negative effects of unobservable student characters. SFRs generated exogenous changes in 
education equity, which can be exploited as quasi-experiments to facilitate causal inference.   
In this study, I use the differential trends of commuting-zone-level intergenerational 
mobility across birth cohorts (Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez 2014; Chetty et al. 2014, CHKS 
from here on) to provide additional evidence on the long-term effects of SFRs. Using population 
based federal tax records, CHKS provides college attendance rates (child income rank) for 10 (7) 
birth cohorts from 1984 to 1993 (1980 to 1986), across the parent income distribution. Due to the 
timing of SFRs, the duration of exposure to SFRs during school years varies from cohort to 
cohort, which serves as the treatment variable that creates exogenous shifts in education equity.  
The first part of the analysis uses the panel fixed effect model to evaluate the effects of 
exposure to SFRs on children’s college attendance rates. The empirical setup is equivalent to the 
difference-in-difference (DD) analysis in the panel data setting. I find that 10 years of exposure 
to SFRs increases the average college attendance rate of lowest-parent-income children by 
5.72%, and reduces the attendance gap between lowest and highest-parent-income children by 
3.92%. Event analysis shows that the impact increases with the duration of exposure following 
an approximately linear trend. Furthermore, as parent income rank increases, the impact of SFRs 
diminishes, also in an approximately linear relationship. The impact of SFRs loses statistical 
significance at about 70% parent income rank (100% being the highest). These results indicate 
that, in the long-term, SFRs have substantial equalization effects on college attendance, and the 
equalization is achieved by leveling-up, not leveling-down. However, similar analysis on child 
income ranks finds now significant results. Possible reasons for not finding significant results for 
income ranks are discussed.  
The second part of the analysis quantifies the impacts of education expenditure equity on 
intergenerational mobility, using exposure to SFRs as the instrumental variable. I first construct 
education equity measures following Card and Payne (2002). For each cohort in each state, the 
equity of education is measured by the expenditure-income gradient, defined as the association 
(regression coefficient) between school district education expenditure per pupil and median 
income. I find that exposure to SFRs reduces the expenditure-income gradient, and that one 
standard deviation decrease in expenditure-income gradient increases the college attendance 
rates for the lowest-parent-income students by 2.06% and reduces the college attendance 
inequality by 2.87%. In contrast to the 2SLS results, OLS regressions produce unexpected 
results, demonstrating the importance of addressing the endogeneity bias. Overall, these results 
are consistent with the theoretical prediction (Solon 2004) that weakening the linkage between 
education expenditure and parent income should lead to higher intergenerational mobility. 
Placing the magnitudes of these effects in context, I concluded that policies aimed at increasing 
education equity, such as SFRs, can substantially increase poor children’s college attendance but 
they alone are not enough to overcome the high degree of existing inequalities. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines empirical 
strategies and Section III introduces data. Section IV presents results from the DD analysis that 
evaluates the impacts of SFRs on intergenerational mobility. Section V presents the 2SLS 
estimations that quantifies the impacts of education equity on intergenerational mobility, using 
exposure to SFRs as instruments, and Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Empirical Strategy 
II a. Difference-in-difference analysis of the impact of SFRs. 
The objective of this part of the analysis is to test whether exposure to court-ordered 
school finance reforms has positive impacts on various mobility measures, and if yes, quantify 
the sizes of these impacts. For college attendance analysis (demonstrated in Figure. 3), the first 
cohort in this study started school in 1990 and finished in 2002, while the last cohort started 
school in 1999 and finished in 2011. For child income rank, the first cohort was born in 1980 and 
the last cohort was born in 1986. The duration of exposure to SFRs during school years, ranging 
from 0 to 12, is our key independent variable. 
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
The mobility measures include the college attendance rates (income rank) of children 
from various family backgrounds, measure by their parents’ income ranking. Another useful 
measure of mobility is the slopes that characterize the linear relationships between the college 
attendance rate (child income rank) and parent income ranking, which represent the outcome 
gaps between children from highest and lowest income families. Let 𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐𝑠𝑡 be the omnibus 
symbol for the mobility measures for birth cohort 𝑡 in commuting zone 𝑐 of state 𝑠, the 
regression model is of the following form:  
𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝑐 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑠𝑡              (1) 
      𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ_𝑦𝑟 + 6 − 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚_𝑦𝑟  𝑖𝑓  𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ_𝑦𝑟 + 6 − 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚_𝑦𝑟 > 0,  0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
The coefficient 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑝 is the main result of interest. For SFRs that happened before a certain cohort 
entered school, the 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡 variable allows older reforms to have different impacts from more 
recent reforms (Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach 2016). I control for a host of commuting 
zone-cohort level covariates to increase the precision of the model. Commuting zone fixed 
effects are represented by 𝜃𝑐 which captures time-invariant omitted variables, cohort fixed 
effects 𝛾𝑡 captures time variant omitted variables that are common to all commuting zones. With 
the inclusion of both 𝜃𝑐 and 𝛾𝑡, this is the standard setup for a DD analysis in the panel data 
setting with the treatments applied at different time points for different groups (in our case 
states). In absence of the treatment (when 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 is 0), this model assumes that commuting 
zones will follow the same time trend 𝛾𝑡, which is the DD assumption. The error term 𝜀𝑐𝑠𝑡 is 
clustered at the state level, allowing for within-state spatial correlations as well as 
autocorrelations (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). 
The above parametric model assumes the impact of SFRs to be proportional to the 
duration of the exposure. However, non-linearity cn arise for various reasons. For instance, if 
later investment in education depends on earlier investment, then SFRs will only have effects if 
the duration of exposure is sufficiently long. On the other hand, if there are decreasing returns to 
investment, then the effects of SFRs will plateau after certain amount of exposure. The following 
semi-parametric specification is estimated to relax the linearity assumption: 
𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐𝑠𝑡 = ∑ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑖𝑠𝑡
12
𝑖=−5
+ 𝛽𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝑐 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑠𝑡         (2) 
In the above equation, the linear exposure variable in equation (1) is replaced by a set of dummy 
variables 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑖𝑠𝑡, representing different exposure duration. For instance, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_8𝑠𝑡 =
1 if the cohort experienced exactly 8 years of SFRs, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_8𝑠𝑡 = 0 otherwise. Besides the 
ability to capture non-linearity, this setup (sometime known as event analysis) can test for 
preexisting trends. If court verdicts are truly exogenous, they should not have effects on cohorts 
that missed the reform. On the other hand, if the observed treatment effect is the artifact of 
certain unobserved trends, these trends will also have effects on cohorts that missed the 
treatment. In this placebo test, we expect that dummy variables representing missing the SFRs 
(i<0) to have little effects. 
 
II b. 2SLS estimation of the impacts of education equity on intergenerational mobility 
Intuitively, if public education financing becomes more equitable, children from poor 
families are going to receive more resources resulting in higher levels of upward mobility. This 
intuition is formalized in Solon’s (2004) model where the author shows that intergenerational 
mobility, reversely measured by intergenerational elasticity, increases with the progressivity of 
the public education system.  
However, cross-country patterns of intergenerational mobility and education equity do 
not always conform to this intuition and the predictions of Solon’s model. For example, Checchi 
et al. (1999) present evidence that Italy, despite having a more egalitarian education system than 
the U.S., exhibit less intergenerational mobility across occupations and education level. To 
reconcile this paradox, the authors devised a theoretical model in which a centralized education 
system could produce less intergenerational mobility compared to the private education system 
by stifling individual efforts. Needless to say, causality cannot be established with a two-country 
comparison. However, Checchi et al. (1999) demonstrate that the relationship between education 
equity and intergenerational mobility is not theoretically given, and that more empirical evidence 
is needed to establish the causality between the two. 
One straightforward approach to estimate the impacts of education equity on 
intergenerational mobility is to directly regress mobility measures on education equity measures 
using the panel fixed effects model. Although superior to cross-sectional analysis, OLS analysis 
using panel data still suffers from strong endogeneity concerns. Public funding is usually tied to 
the proportion of disadvantaged students, such as students who are learning English as a second 
language. An increase in the proportion of these students would cause public funding to increase. 
However, the positive impacts of additional funding might be offset by the negative effects of 
unobservable student characters.  
In this part, I use court-ordered finance reform as the exogenous shifter to quantify the 
causal impact of education equity on intergenerational mobility.  Inequity measures are 
constructed for each state-cohort pair using a method that is similar to that used in Card and 
Payne (2002). The following school-district-level regression is estimated for each state 𝑠 and 
cohort 𝑡: 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑑 = 𝛽0, + 𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑐 ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑑 + 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝑒𝑑        (3) 
School districts are index by 𝑑, the indexes for states and cohorts are suppressed. Total per pupil 
expenditure 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑑 is averaged over the period when the children is in school (from 6 to 18 years 
old.)  School district median family income 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑑 is measured at the time when the child 
first enter school (6 years old). The coefficient of education expenditure regressed on median 
family income 𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑐 is the measure of education inequality for that state/cohort (called 
expenditure-income gradient, or EIG). Following Card and Payne (2002), the control variables 
include dummy variables for school districts with less than 100 pupils, with 100 to 200 students, 
and with 200 to 300 students; the log of the average school size within the district, the ratio of 
population living in urban areas, and the ratio of black and native American population, all 
measured when the cohort is 6-years-old. The regression is weighted by the number of pupils in 
the school district. 
 State-cohort level education equity (reversely measured by EIG) is used as an 
explanatory variable for the different measures of intergenerational mobility. It is assumed to be 
endogenous to the determination of mobility, and is instrumented by the cohort’s exposure to 
court-ordered SFRs using the 2SLS method: 
𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑐𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐1𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝑐 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑠𝑡        (4) 
𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝑝𝐸𝐼?̂?𝑐𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐2𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃′𝑐 + 𝛾′𝑡 + 𝜀′𝑐𝑠𝑡      (5) 
Because 𝐸𝐼?̂?𝑐𝑠𝑡 is an estimated coefficient, the first stage regression is weighted by the inverse of 
the standard deviation of the equity estimation. 
 
III. Data 
III a. School Finance Lawsuits 
Starting from the Serrano v. Priest 1971 case in California, school finance lawsuits had 
been brought up in 42 states. Among them, 29 had at least one verdict in favor of reforms. 
Political scientists and economist (Lynn 2011; Baicker and Gordon 2006) have found the results 
of school finance lawsuits, often determined by intense and protracted legal battles, hard to 
predict. Therefore, they are often considered as exogenous by economists. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Due to the broad interests in SFRs, inventories of school finance lawsuits have been 
assembled by various sources. In this study, I adopt a recent catalog by Jackson et al. (2015), 
which contains information for both legislative reforms and school finance lawsuits, the type of 
the lawsuits, the results of the lawsuits, and the type of school finance formulas adopted before 
and after the SFRs (table 1). In this study, I only consider the court-ordered reforms, because the 
legislative reforms might be endogenous. Also, since a successful lawsuit may open the gate for 
successive lawsuits, I only consider the first lawsuit overturning the existing system. Finally, the 
treatment is defined by the result of the lawsuits, ignoring differences in the strength of state 
response and the type of new funding formulas adopted. These responses are from the legislation 
and are not exogenous to local conditions as court decisions. Therefore, the estimations in this 
paper should be interpreted as the average total effect of initial SFRs and the subsequent SFRs 
that they brought about.  
III b. Mobility data 
Intergenerational mobility data are published with the CHKS studies, and detail 
information can be found in the original papers. Here I only provide a brief introduction to 
facilitate readers’ understanding of the present study. Intergenerational mobility is measured at 
the commuting-zone-level by the associations between children’s college attendance rate 
(income rank) and their parents’ family income. These aggregates come from population based, 
individual level federal tax records, which remain confidential to most researchers. The college 
attendance (child income rank) data is available for 10 (7) birth cohorts from 1984 to 1993 (1980 
to 1986). 
College attendance is measured at age 19, child income is measured at age 26, and parent 
income is measured when the children is 15 ~ 19 years old. Both child and parent income ranks 
are national: for example, a parent income rank of 0.25 means that the parents’ family income is 
higher than 25% of other parents of the child’s birth cohort in the US. Children are assigned to 
locations based on where they were first claimed as dependents in tax records, regardless of 
whether they migrated later on. Because the first year of the tax data is 1996, 98.9% of children 
are assigned to their location in 1996 or 1997. CHKS showed that in a given geographical unit, 
both the college attendance rate and child income rank have approximately linear relationships 
with parent income rank and can be summarized by intercepts and slopes. The intercept 
represents the average college attendance rate (income rank) of children with the lowest parent 
income rank, while the slope represents the difference between children with the highest and the 
lowest parent income rank. The average outcome of children with any parent income rank can be 
calculated using the intercept and the slope. Because parent income is measured as national 
ranks, the results are comparable across commuting zones.  
 
III c. School districts finance and demographic data 
State-cohort level education expenditure equity measures are constructed from school 
district-level data. These data includes elementary and secondary school expenditure data from 
Census of Government (compiled in Data Files on Historical Finances of Individual 
Governments) and Local Education Agency Finance Survey (F-33) data from National Center 
for Education Statistics (NCES). The former contains information for independent school 
districts from 1967 to 2012, while the later contains all school districts from 1990 to 2010 (1991, 
1993, and 1994 are not available). The NCES data is used when possible, and missing 
observations are imputed using the average of the two nearby years. I only keep school districts 
that have no missing data after imputation for all years under study (from 1990 to 2011). School 
district characteristics are from Local Education Agency Universe Survey Data by NCES, which 
contains enrollment and the number of schools. Demographic data for school districts include 
median family income, the ratio of population living in urban areas, and the ratios of black and 
Native American population, which can be found in the Census School District Tabulation Data 
accessed through the School Districts Demographic System of NCES. For each cohort, the 
expenditure variable is averaged over the years that the cohort is in primary and secondary 
schools, and the school characteristics and demographic variables are measured at year when the 
cohort is 6 years old. Demographic data are only available every 10 years, and the years in-
between are calculated using linear interpolations. 
III d. Commuting-zone-level covariates 
The following time-variant commuting zone level variables are included as controls to 
increase the precision of the model. Medicaid benefits, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Programs (SNAP) benefits, and Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC) benefits (all for Bureau of 
Economic Analysis), normalized by the population below 125% poverty line (which is roughly 
how the eligibility of these programs is determined) control for other government policies. 
Poverty rates (Decennial Census and American Community Survey), unemployment rates 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics), the share of manufacturing employment (BEA), per capita personal 
income (BEA), and violent crimes (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reporting 
Program Data) per year per thousand population control for local socio-economic conditions. 
The number of degree granting institutions with Title IV programs per million population, the 
enrollment (first-time undergraduate in the fall semester) of these colleges per thousand 
population, and the enrollment weighted 1-year tuitions and fees for in-state undergraduate 
students living on campus control for local access to colleges (National Center for Education 
Statistics, Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System). Monetary variables have been 
deflated to 1992 dollars using the nation Consumer Price Index published by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. The college access variables are measured at the year when the child turns 18 
(e.g. 2011 college data for the 1993 cohort), all other variables are averaged over the period 
between birth and 18 years old (e.g. 1993~2011 data for the 1993 birth cohort.)  Poverty between 
census years are linear interpolations from nearest census years. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
IV. Evaluating the effects of SFRs on intergenerational mobility using DD 
IV a. DD results 
This section reports the effects of exposure to SFRs on intergenerational mobility 
measured by college attendance rates and child income rank. Table 4 reports the effects of years 
of exposure on the college attendance rates of children with bottom parent income, top parent 
income, and on the college attendance slope. Results with and without commuting-zone-level 
covariates are reported separately, and the latter is the preferred specification. For children with 
bottom parent income, 10 years of exposure to the initial SFR increase average college 
attendance rate by 5.72%, which is about a third of the pooled average at the bottom parent 
income level (table 2). For children with top parent income, 10 years of exposure to the initial 
SFR has a statistically insignificant effect of 1.28%. In the specification with no covariates, the 
effect is higher (2.37%) and weakly significant, but it is insubstantial compared to the pooled 
average of 87% at the top parent income ranking. Turning to the college attendance slope, I 
found that 10 years of exposure to SFR reduces the attendance gap between children with top 
and bottom parent income by 3.92%. This reduction reflects that fact that SFRs have strong 
positive effects on children with bottom parent income and weaker positive effects on children 
with top parent income. The estimation is stable with or without the inclusion of commuting-
zone-level covariate, which is evidence supporting the exogeneity of court-ordered SFRs. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
However, when similar analysis is performed on child income rank, exposure to SFRs 
has small and statistically insignificant effects on all three mobility measures. The lack of effects 
could be due to deficiencies in the data. The income data only contains 7 cohorts (1980 ~ 1986), 
meaning that the first and last cohorts have substantial overlap in primary and secondary schools. 
Also, to have a panel as long as possible, children’s income is measured in one year at age 26. 
This age is at the lower end of the acceptable range to measure child income (Solon 1992), and 
can cause income measures to be noisy. Despite these data concerns, there remains the 
possibility that SFRs have little impacts on children’s adult income, which would contradict 
recent finding by Jackson et al. (2015) and confirm early conclusions by (Hanushek 2003). The 
remaining analysis is only conducted on college attendance rate. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Next, the regression with covariates is conducted for children on different points of the 
parent income spectrum. Because the trend is smooth, the analysis is conducted on 10% intervals 
on the parent income ranking. As shown in Figure 4, the impact of SFR is highest for children 
with bottom parent income, and decrease to statistical insignificance at about 70% parent income 
ranking. With every 10% increase in parent income ranking, the impact of SFRs decreases about 
0.39%, but is positive throughout the parent income spectrum. There are potentially two 
mechanisms driving this downward trend: first, the funding changes caused by SFRs are 
progressive; second, the outcomes of children with lower parent income are more sensitive to the 
same amount of funding increase, because of diminishing returns to education investment. These 
results show that SFRs have progressive impacts on children’s college attendance rate, achieved 
by raising the performance of children with lower parent income. This is consistent with 
previous literature that found SFRs achieve equalization by leveling-up (Murray et al. 1998). 
 
[Insert Figure. 4 Here] 
 
By measuring the impacts of SFRs as the number years of exposure, it is assumed that the 
effect increase linearly with the duration of exposure. I examine this assumption by replacing 
years of exposure with dummies variables indicating each year of exposure. As Figure 3 shows, 
starting from no exposure (=0), the effects of the initial SFR on children with lowest parent 
income increase in an approximately linear relationship with the duration of the exposure, 
suggesting that the more parsimonious specification has capture the underlying data generation 
process. Also, the college attendance slope decreases with the years of exposure, also in an 
approximately linear fashion. The effects of SFRs on children with highest parent income hover 
around zero throughout the years and is not statistically significant.  
[Insert Figure. 3 Here] 
IV b. Robustness checks 
Testing the exogeneity of court verdicts using failed lawsuits 
The identifying assumption of this study is that court verdicts are unpredictable, therefore 
can be treated as exogenous events. However, while the verdicts themselves are arguably 
exogenous, the decisions by legal activists to file these lawsuits may depend on local conditions. 
For example, legal activists may prioritize states that have large existing inequality in education. 
Since to have a verdict there has to be a lawsuit first, the observed treatment effects could be 
driven by unobserved local conditions that are correlated with the occurrence of lawsuits. 
To test for this potential endogeneity, exposure to the first court verdict upholding the 
current system (i.e. failed lawsuits) is included together with exposure to SFRs. The results in 
table 6 show that in all regressions under the preferred specification, exposure to failed lawsuits 
have no significant impact on children’s outcome. Even if the occurrence of lawsuits is driven by 
unobserved local trends, this test finds no evidence that these trends are correlated with mobility 
outcomes. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
The problem caused by migration 
In the CHKS data, children are assigned to the location where they first showed up as 
dependents of their parents in the tax records. For 98.9% of children, their location is determined 
by where they lived in 1996 or 1997, which is the first year of available tax records. Because 
children’s location is only observed once, they could have lived in a different state from where 
they are assigned to. Although inter-state migration rate is low in the U.S. and have been 
decreasing in recent decades (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 2011), its potential impacts on our 
results should not be neglected.  
 First, migration can cause measurement errors in the treatment variable. The number of 
years of exposure is calculated based on the assumption that the children live in the same state 
throughout their school years, which is not true for children who migrated cross states. The 
standard econometric results tell us that measurement errors in independent variables will bias 
the coefficients toward zero, making the treatment effects that we measured a conservative lower 
bound.  
 Second, parents’ can migrate in response to the SFRs, causing endogeneity. Low-income 
parents may choose to migrate into states with SFRs seeking better education for their children. 
These children are likely to be more upward mobile either because their parents are more willing 
to invest in their education and/or because they are more talented. Compared to the measurement 
errors caused by exogenous migration, endogenous migration causes a bigger problem because it 
may change how the treatment effect should be interpreted: instead of the result of investment in 
education, the treatment effect could merely be the result of changing demographic composition 
in cohorts.  
 Since most children’s location is assigned in 1997, we expect that only SFRs happened 
before the location assignment have impacts on the cohort composition. If endogenous migration 
is driving the observed treatment effects, SFRs after 1997 would have much lower effects 
because they cannot influence cohort composition. Table 7 presents results where reforms before 
(including) 1997 and reforms after 1997 are entered separately. The results show that post-1997 
SFRs have slightly stronger effects on the intercept, in contrary to the predictions of endogenous 
migration. Therefore, although I cannot completely rule out the existence of endogenous 
migration, there is no evidence that it is driving the observed treatment effect. 
V. 2SLS estimations  
 This section presents 2SLS estimations where exposure to court-ordered SFRs is used as 
the instrumental variable to quantify the impact of education equity on college attendance 
outcomes. The baseline specifications use one variable to measure exposure, while dummy 
variables representing years of exposure (from 0 to 12) are used as instruments in robustness 
checks. Education equity is measured by the expenditure-income gradient, representing how 
much per pupil expenditure would increase with one dollar increase in school-district median 
family income. To make the results easier to interpret, the expenditure-income gradient variable 
has been normalized to mean of zero and standard deviation of 1. The dependent variables are 
the average college attendance rates for children with the lowest parent income, for children with 
highest parent income, and the attendance slope representing the difference between the two.  
 The first stage regression results (Appendix Table 1) show that 10 years of exposure to 
reform reduces the expenditure-income gradient by about 1.04 standard deviations (s.d.=2.65 
cents/dollar). This is consistent with Card and Payne (2002) which uses similar first-stage 
regressions. It shows that exposure to SFR increases education equity by reducing the 
expenditure-income gradient. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
 I use the predicted expenditure-income gradient in second stage regressions (table 8). The 
baseline results show that a one standard deviation increase in expenditure-income gradient will 
decrease the average college attendance rate of children with the lowest parent income by 2.87%, 
and reduced the attendance slope by 2.42%. These effects are slightly smaller in the robustness 
checks using dummy variables as instruments. Expenditure-income gradient shows no significant 
income on the attendance rates of children with the highest parent income. OLS estimations, 
when statistically significant, produce the opposite results with 2SLS, demonstrating the 





SFRs are built upon the premise that by increasing the equity of education expenditures, 
the students’ outcome will depend less on their family backgrounds. Using commuting-zone-
level intergenerational mobility data for 10 birth cohorts, this study evaluates the long-term 
effects of SFRs on college attendance rates, and tests the above premise. The results show that 
SFRs have made a meaningful impact on low-income-student in terms of college attendance: for 
children with lowest parent income, 10 years exposure to SFRs will increase their college 
attendance rate by 5.72%, or a 35.2% relative increase from children with corresponding parent 
income but did not experience SFRs. This impact decreases linearly with parent income rank, 
and becomes statistically insignificant at about 70% parent income rank, but remains positive. As 
a result, 10 years of exposure to SFRs decreases attendance rate gap between children with 
lowest and highest parent income by 3.94%. These findings suggest that SFRs have improved the 
college attendance equality by lifting up low income children. Event analysis shows that effect 
increases in proportion to the duration of exposure to SFRs. However, when income rank is used 
as the mobility measure, SFRs show no significant effects. This seems to contradict recent results 
by Jackson et al. (2015), however it could also be the result of lower data quality in income ranks 
compared to college attendance rates. 
 After quantifying the impacts of SFRs, this paper uses SFRs as natural experiments to 
answer a broader question: to what degree, if any, intergenerational mobility is determined by 
education equity? This paper finds that education equity has statistically significant effects, but 
the size of effect depends on the mobility concept in question. If mobility is measured by the 
chance of children from poorest families making it to college, then one standard deviation 
increase in education equity can increase this chance by 2.87%, or a 17.7% relative increase; if 
mobility is measured by the relative difference between the poorest and richest children, then one 
standard deviation increase reduces this gap by 2.42%, which is only a 3.38% relative decrease. 
For policymakers, it suggests that policies aimed at increasing education equity, such as SFRs, 
can substantially benefit poor children but they alone are not enough to overcome the high 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Court verdicts of school finance litigations and the subsequent reforms types. 
State 
Year of first 
verdict against 
SFRs  
Year of first verdict 
for SFRs 
Type of lawsuits 
Alabama  1993 Adequacy 
Alaska  1999 Adequacy 
Arizona 1973 1994 Adequacy 
Arkansas  1983 Equity 
California 1986 1971 Equity 
Colorado 1982   
Connecticut 1985 1978 Equity 
Delaware    
District of Columbia    
Florida 1996   
Georgia 1981   
Hawaii    
Idaho 1975 1998 Adequacy 
Illinois 1973   
Indiana    
Iowa    
Kansas 1981 1972 Equity 
Kentucky 2007 1989 Adequacy 
Louisiana 1976   
Maine 1995   
Maryland 1972 2005 Adequacy 
Massachusetts 2005 1993 Adequacy 
Michigan 1973 1997 Adequacy 
Minnesota 1971   
Mississippi    
Missouri  1993 Adequacy 
Montana  1989 Equity 
Nebraska 1993   
Nevada    
New Hampshire  1993 Adequacy 
New Jersey  1973 Equity 
New Mexico  1998 Equity 
New York 1972 2003 Adequacy 
North Carolina 1987 1997 Adequacy 
North Dakota 1993   
Ohio 1979 1997 Adequacy 
Oklahoma 1987   
Oregon 1976 2009 Adequacy 
 
Table. 1 (Continued)    
Pennsylvania 1975   
Rhode Island 1995   
South Carolina 1988 2005 Adequacy 
South Dakota    
Tennessee  1993 Equity 
Texas 1989 1973 Equity 
Utah    
Vermont 1994 1997 Equity 
Virginia 1994   
Washington 1974 1977 Adequacy 
West Virginia  1979 Adequacy 
Wisconsin 1989 1976 Equity 
Wyoming   1980 Equity 
















Table 2. Summary statistics for college attendance analysis 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Pct. Change 
College gradient 0.72 0.08 -8.32 
College intercept 0.15 0.08 14.43 
Poverty rate 18.05 6.76 13.75 
Child poverty rate 18.20 6.78 14.29 
Per capita income 18.88 3.54 12.28 
Manu. Employment 11.22 5.21 -31.16 
Medicaid 2.91 1.03 51.72 
SNAP 0.35 0.12 23.13 
EITC 0.40 0.08 65.47 
Unemployment 5.94 2.12 1.96 
Crime 3.07 2.07 -7.69 
#. Of colleges 19.30 16.68 -3.77 
Enrollment 9.88 36.96 7.00 
Tuition 4.26 3.20 2.86 
Notes: The first column and the second column are the means and 
standard deviations of the variables. The third column is the 
percentage change from the average of the 1984 and 1985 cohorts 
to the average of the 1993 and 1994 cohorts. All changes are 











Table 3. Summary statistics for income rank analysis 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Pct. Change 
Rank-rank slope 0.27 0.06 1.43 
Rank intercept 0.39 0.06 1.66 
Poverty rate 17.84 7.09 -0.56 
Child poverty rate 17.94 7.12 -0.47 
Per capita income 17.50 3.14 7.87 
Manu. Employment 13.70 7.52 -13.81 
Medicaid 2.13 0.83 40.37 
SNAP 0.34 0.12 -2.83 
EITC 0.27 0.06 55.51 
Unemployment 6.07 2.47 -5.49 
Crime 3.20 2.38 -1.43 
#. Of colleges 19.84 16.73 -1.41 
Enrollment 8.00 7.78 8.54 
Tuition 3.62 2.88 14.22 
Notes: The first column and the second column are the 
mean and standard deviations of the variables. The third 
column is the percentage change from the average of the 
1980 and 1981 cohorts to the average of the 1985 and 
1986 cohorts. All changes are statistically significant at 












Table 4. DD estimations of the impacts of 10-years-exposure to SFRs on the college attendance rate of bottom 
and top income children and on the college attendance gradient. 
  
College attendance 
bottom income   
College attendance          
top income   
College attendance    
gradient 
Exposure 0.0572*** 0.0520***  0.0237* 0.0128  -0.0335* -0.0392** 
 (0.0127) (0.0129)  (0.0127) (0.0138)  (0.0182) (0.0155) 
Reform vintage 0.0065 0.0152*  -0.0291* -0.0196  -0.0355* -0.0348** 
 (0.0100) (0.0081)  (0.0165) (0.0131)  (0.0177) (0.0140) 
Poverty rate  -0.0382   -0.1030***   -0.0648** 
  (0.0308)   (0.0276)   (0.0314) 
Child poverty rate  0.0449   0.1034***   0.0585* 
  (0.0306)   (0.0267)   (0.0309) 
Per capita income  -0.0023   0.0028   0.0051 
  (0.0028)   (0.0031)   (0.0047) 
Manu. Employment 0.0005   0.0009   0.0004 
  (0.0007)   (0.0014)   (0.0015) 
Medicaid  -0.0088   0.0002   0.0090 
  (0.0083)   (0.0144)   (0.0142) 
SNAP  0.0250   0.0570   0.0320 
  (0.0823)   (0.1082)   (0.1214) 
EITC  0.3073***   -0.1160*   -0.4233*** 
  (0.0573)   (0.0675)   (0.0947) 
Unemployment  0.0149***   0.0290***   0.0141 
  (0.0045)   (0.0081)   (0.0096) 
Crime  -0.0003   -0.0030   -0.0027 
  (0.0024)   (0.0019)   (0.0028) 
#. Of colleges  0.0001   0.0004   0.0002 
  (0.0003)   (0.0006)   (0.0007) 
Enrollment  0.0006   -0.0005   -0.0011** 
  (0.0004)   (0.0003)   (0.0004) 
Tuition  -0.0006   -0.0010   -0.0003 
  (0.0008)   (0.0006)   (0.0007) 
Missing tuition  0.0159*   -0.0348**   -0.0507*** 
  (0.0085)   (0.0141)   (0.0187) 
_cons 0.1210*** -0.2191**  0.8471*** 0.6261***  0.7261*** 0.8452*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0850)  (0.0145) (0.1205)  (0.0204) (0.1464) 
N 7,665 7,655   7,665 7,655   7,665 7,655 







Table 5. The effects of ten years exposure to SFR on children's income rank. 
  
Child income rank at 
bottom parent income   
Child income rank at 
top parent income   
Rank-rank slope 
Exposure 0.0008 0.0021  -0.0041 -0.0049  -0.0049 -0.0070 
 (0.0117) (0.0060)  (0.0116) (0.0066)  (0.0183) (0.0085) 
Reform vintage -0.0042 0.0002  0.0071 -0.0000  0.0113 -0.0002 
 (0.0127) (0.0070)  (0.0112) (0.0071)  (0.0147) (0.0083) 
Covariates N Y  N Y  N Y 
Constant 0.3921*** 0.3958***  0.6637*** 0.6393***  0.2716*** 0.2435** 
 (0.0090) (0.0551)  (0.0096) (0.0737)  (0.0137) (0.0957) 
N 5,416 5,409   5,416 5,409   5,416 5,409 


















Table 6. Robustness check with court decisions upholding the status quo. 
  
College attendance 
bottom income   
College attendance          
top income   
College attendance    
gradient 
Exposure 0.0555*** 0.0500***  0.0234* 0.0124  -0.0321 -0.0377** 
 (0.0130) (0.0127)  (0.0134) (0.0140)  (0.0193) (0.0163) 
Upheld -0.0188 -0.0199  -0.0025 -0.0047  0.0164 0.0153 
 (0.0318) (0.0346)  (0.0216) (0.0212)  (0.0308) (0.0253) 
Reform vintage 0.0050 0.0136*  -0.0293* -0.0200  -0.0342* -0.0336** 
 (0.0105) (0.0080)  (0.0170) (0.0135)  (0.0186) (0.0146) 
Covariates N Y  N Y  N Y 
Constant 0.1356*** -0.2090**  0.8490*** 0.6285***  0.7134*** 0.8375*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0889)  (0.0261) (0.1227)  (0.0379) (0.1480) 
N 7,665 7,655   7,665 7,655   7,665 7,655 
















Table 7. Robustness check for sorting. 
  
College attendance 
bottom income   
College attendance          
top income   
College attendance    
gradient 
Exp_before1997 0.0554*** 0.0509***  0.0198 0.0089  -0.0356* -0.0420** 
 (0.0131) (0.0135)  (0.0132) (0.0143)  (0.0188) (0.0161) 
Exp_after1997 0.0732*** 0.0626***  0.0591** 0.0517*  -0.0141 -0.0110 
 (0.0210) (0.0215)  (0.0257) (0.0306)  (0.0361) (0.0413) 
Vintage 0.0058 0.0147*  -0.0305* -0.0212  -0.0364* -0.0359** 
 (0.0100) (0.0080)  (0.0169) (0.0135)  (0.0182) (0.0142) 
Covariates N Y  N Y  N Y 
Constant 0.1140*** -0.2222**  0.8316*** 0.6147***  0.7176*** 0.8369*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0866)  (0.0140) (0.1205)  (0.0227) (0.1490) 
N 7,665 7,655   7,665 7,655   7,665 7,655 


















Table 8. OLS and 2SLS estimations of the impacts of the expenditure-income gradient on the college attendance rate of bottom and top income 
children and on the college attendance gradient. 
  College attendance, bottom income   College attendance, top income   College attendance gradient 
 OLS 2SLS (1) 2SLS (2)  OLS 2SLS (1) 2SLS (2)  OLS 2SLS (1) 2SLS (2) 
Expenditure-gradient 0.0087** -0.0287** -0.0223**  -0.0034 -0.0045 -0.0017  -0.0113** 0.0242* 0.0206* 
 (0.036) (0.0107) (0.0094)  (0.0043) (0.0122) (0.0112)  (0.0049) (0.0126) (0.0119) 
Commuting-zone 
covariates 
Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
First stage F-value NA 13.20 12.13  NA 13.2 12.13  NA 13.2 12.13 
N 7516 7655 7655   7516 7655 7655   7516 7655 7655 
Note: * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The instrument for 2SLS (1) is the number of years 
exposed to SRFs (0~12). The instruments for 2SLS (2) are dummy variables for the years of exposure to SFRs. The first stage of the 2SLS 








































Figure 3. An illustration of the variation in the treatment variable (exposure to SFRs) by state 
and cohort. 
 
Note: The first (last) cohort in this study, represented by the color blue (red), was born in 1984 (1993). They 
enter primary school in 1990 (1999) when they are 6 years old, and finish high school in year 2002 (2011) 
when they are 18 years old. In Ohio, the first court verdict in favor of SFRs came in 1997, so the first cohort 
experienced 7 years of SFRs (Exposure = 7) while the last cohort experienced 12 (Exposure = 12). For the 
last cohort in Ohio, the verdict came 2 years before they entered primary school, so for them the vintage of 
the reform is 2 years (Vintage = 2). If a court verdict came after the cohort entered school or if there is no 












Figure 4. The impacts of SFRs across the parent income spectrum. 
 
Note: College attendance rates are calculated for 10% intervals of parent income ranks using the intercepts 
and slopes published by CHKS. Regressions in table 3 (with covariates) are estimated for each parent 
income rank percentile. The coefficient estimates are represented by the solid line and 90% confidence 
intervals are represented by the dashed lines. The y-axis represents the change in college attendance rate 












Figure 5. The effect of the duration of exposure on the average college attendance rate of 
children with lowest parent income (upper-left), highest parent income (upper-right), and college 











Appendix Table 1: First Stage regression of expenditure gradient regressed on exposure and 
other covariates. 
 Dependent variable Expenditure Gradient  
 Exposure -1.0370***  
  (0.2854)  
 Reform vintage 0.4692***  
  (0.1243)  
 Poverty rate 0.0720  
  (0.1981)  
 Child poverty rate -0.0624  
  (0.1968)  
 Per capita income -0.0247  
  (0.0388)  
 Manu. Employment 0.0235**  
  (0.0099)  
 Medicaid 0.0546  
  (0.0477)  
 SNAP 0.7670  
  (0.9871)  
 EITC 0.7803  
  (0.6679)  
 Unemployment -0.0325  
  (0.0283)  
 Crime -0.0481*  
  (0.0242)  
 #. Of colleges 0.0009  
  (0.0053)  
 Enrollment -0.0012  
  (0.0020)  
 Tuition -0.0043  
  (0.0044)  
 Missing tuition 0.0101  
  (0.0851)  
 cohort_dummy1 1.0013***  
  (0.1294)  
 cohort_dummy2 0.7867***  
  (0.1201)  
 cohort_dummy3 0.6533***  
  (0.1093)  
 cohort_dummy4 0.5223***  
  (0.0984)  
 cohort_dummy5 0.4193***  
  (0.0879)  
 cohort_dummy6 0.3160***  
  (0.0773)  
 cohort_dummy7 0.2306***  
  (0.0667)  
 cohort_dummy8 0.1709***  
  (0.0548)  
 cohort_dummy9 0.1040***  
  (0.0372)  
 _cons -0.5034  
  (0.6415)  
 N 7,516  
 R2_W 0.74  
Note: * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The 
regression is weighted by the inverse of the estimation standard error of the expenditure-
gradient. 
 
